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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20170977-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ROBERT BRIAN WALTON,
Defendant/Appellant.
Reply Brief of Appellant
Pursuant to rule 24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant
Robert Brian Walton, through counsel, answers the facts and arguments raised in
the Brief of Appellee as follows:
FACTS
The State’s recitation of facts consists almost entirely of unproven
allegations of the complaining witness, which do not support the plea agreements
and have not been proven in court. Only those facts that support the plea
agreements are pertinent to this appeal because Mr. Walton’s sentence must be
supported by facts as stated in the guilty pleas. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington,
542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (“exceptional” sentence was not justified “solely on the
basis of the facts admitted in the guilty plea”). As stated in his opening brief, Mr.

Walton denied all allegations, entering his pleas under Alford.1 1R987, 1R994-95;
2R549, 2R555-56.
ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Walton challenges only his sentence, not the plea
agreement.
The State argues that the permanent criminal stalking injunction is not

part of the sentence. Br.Aple. at 13-15. In support, the State argues that the
sentence consisted of only 330 days in jail and that the stalking injunction not
only not a sentence, but the sole consideration. Id. at 14.
A. The permanent criminal stalking injunction is part of the
sentence.
The State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent criminal stalking
injunction—which imposes a lifelong restriction on a person’s liberty—is not a
sentence. As stated in Mr. Walton’s opening brief, this Court has previously
determined that a permanent criminal stalking injunction is a sentence. See See
Br.Aplt. at 11; State v. Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 23, 360 P.3d 1 (quoting Utah R.
Crim. P. 22(e)) (“[W]e conclude that the district court’s failure to enter the
injunction amounted to an omission of ‘a term required to be imposed by statute’
as a consequence of Kropf’s stalking conviction.”). The State’s failure to respond

In addition, Mr. Walton wants the court to know that apart from the charged
conduct, he has not been charged with any incident involving K.B. Additionally,
the allegations of Case No. 161907013 were the result of an invite by K.B. which
Mr. Walton only responded to after he checked with police and learned there was
no injunction in place. 2R45; 2R556-57. And, the injunction was not actually
entered by the Court until July 5, 2016—days after the charged conduct. 2R45.
1
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to this argument or to cite any authority to support its position that a permanent
criminal stalking injunction is not a sentence is reason enough to vacate the
illegal sentence. See State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 20, 345 P.3d 1226 (“[A]n
appellee who fails to respond to the merits of an appellant’s argument will risk
default.”). 2
B. The permanent criminal stalking injunction was only
partial consideration.
This is not to say that the sentence, including the permanent criminal
stalking injunction, was not part of the consideration. A sentence is generally
part of the consideration in plea agreements. See, e.g., Manning v. State, 2004
UT App 87, ¶ 32, 89 P.3d 196 (“[W]hether the defendant received the sentence
bargained for as part of the plea” is part of analysis of plea agreement) (citation
omitted).
That an illegal sentence is included in a plea agreement does not take the
analysis outside of Rule 11(e). Mr. Walton is not challenging his conviction as the
State asserts. See Br.Aple. at 15. He is not arguing a complete lack of
The State also argues that the permanent criminal stalking injunction is not part
of the sentence because the trial court did not see it as such. Br.Aple. at 14.
However, under Rule 22(e) challenge to an illegal sentence, conclusions of law
are reviewed for correctness awarding no deference to the trial court. See, e.g.,
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, ¶ 16, 353 P.3d 55; State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, ¶ 13,
274 P.3d 919. The State cites no authority to support the trial court’s reasoning as
to the nature of the permanent criminal stalking injunction, so this Court should
not consider it. See Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 20, 345 P.3d 1226
2
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consideration or that the entire plea agreement is unconscionable as the State
suggests. See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1996) (citing Bekins
Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 459-62 (Utah 1983)) (“[U]nder Utah
law, an unconscionable agreement is not enforceable.”); Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976)(“Where consideration
is lacking, there can be no contract.”). Rather, as stated in his opening brief, Mr.
Walton’s argument is that the stalking injunction amounts to an illegal sentence,
and should therefore be severed from the plea agreement. See Br.Aplt. at 14-16.
The State fails to answer Mr. Walton’s argument that even without the
permanent criminal stalking injunction, there was adequate consideration—his
third degree felony conviction and the more than 24 months he served in jail. See
Br.Aplt. at 15; Br.Aple. at 14-15. The State also cites no authority to support its
assertion that consideration for a plea agreement can consist entirely of "terms
that fall outside” of the realm of a conviction or sentence, and counsel could find
none. See Br.Aple. at 15.
This Court should “refuse to relieve the State of what it now considers a
bad bargain where the plea agreement was the result of uninduced mistake as to
the current provisions of Utah statute.” See, e.g., State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,
388 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (defendant entitled to resentencing under plea
agreement that included illegal sentence). It should uphold the plea agreement
while vacating the permanent criminal stalking injunction.
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II.

The permanent criminal stalking injunction is a sentence
that is illegal under the circumstances.
The State argues that because there is no explicit statutory prohibition on

issuing a permanent criminal stalking injunction for non-stalking convictions,
such injunctions should be an allowed sentence for apparently any conviction.
See Br.Aple. 16-17. The State further argues that this Court should consider a
permanent criminal stalking injunction to be a civil penalty. See Id.
As an initial matter, the State cites no authority to support its argument
that a sentence cannot be illegal so long as there is no express statutory bar on it.
Nor does the State cite any authority from any jurisdiction allowing a permanent
criminal stalking injunction to issue absent a stalking conviction. As a result, the
State’s argument is inadequately briefed the Court should not consider it. See,
e.g., Broderick v. Apt. Mgmt. Consultants, L.L.C., 2012 UT 17, ¶ 10, 279 P.3d 391
(“[W]e expect that both appellants and appellees will adhere to the standard of
legal analysis set forth in rule 24(a).”).
In any event, the State’s argument lacks merit. The Utah Criminal Code
has specifically abolished common law crimes: “[N]o conduct is a crime unless
made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.” Utah Code Ann. §
76-1-105. One of the core purposes of Utah’s Criminal Code is to “[p]rescribe
penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of the offenses and which
permit the recognition or differences in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders.” Id. § 76-1-104(3). The Code also seeks to “[p]revent
-5-

arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or convicted of offenses.”
Id. § 76-1-104(4). Likewise, illegal sentences are those “‘where the sentence does
not conform to the crime of which the defendant has been convicted.’” State v.
Headley, 2002 UT App 58U (quoting State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1043 n.2
(Utah Ct. App. 1994)). The State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent
criminal stalking injunction conforms to the crime of retaliation against a
witness. Or that this Court should stray from its long-standing precedence of
requiring a sentence to be authorized by code and proportionate to the offense.
Instead, the State—again—without citing authority that Rule 11(e) should be
limited only to length of incarceration.3 None of these arguments rebuts Mr.

Indeed, ruling that parties can agree to any sentence that is not explicitly
barred, even if not authorized by statute, would overrule a long line of cases
holding otherwise. See, e.g., Kropf, 2015 UT App 223, ¶ 23 (holding permanent
criminal stalking injunction could be imposed under Rule 11); Patience, 944 P.2d
at 384 (sentencing a defendant according to felony statute was illegal when
defendant should have been sentenced to a misdemeanor); State v. Sinju, 1999
UT App 150U, ¶ 6 (defendant entitled to resentencing where plea agreement did
not support sentencing enhancement). The absence of an explicit bar does not
mean a sentence can be agreed to. For example, although the indeterminate
sentencing statutes use the word “may” rather than shall and do not exclude
other sentences, it is generally accepted that the stated terms for each degree are
the ranges allowed by statute, unless the statute otherwise provides. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-3-203, -204. Likewise, although the capital felony penalties
provision does not specifically state that the death penalty “only” applies to
capital cases, a prosecutor would be hard-pressed to argue in favor of the death
penalty for a non-capital case. Although this is an extreme example, the State’s
advocacy of allowing parties, including unrepresented defendants, to stipulate to
punishments that don’t fit the crime would create a dangerous grey area for
defendants who may be pressured into sentences that don’t fit their crimes.
3
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Walton’s contention that a permanent criminal stalking injunction is an illegal
sentence where there has been no stalking conviction.
Instead, the State suggests that this Court should consider a permanent
criminal stalking injunction—which is referenced in only the criminal stalking
statute—should be an allowable civil penalty. See Br.Aple. 17 n.8. The State also
cites no authority to support its assertion that a permanent criminal stalking
injunction is merely a civil penalty and that it therefore not an illegal sentence.
See Br.Aple. 17 n. 8. This Court should therefore decline to consider it. See, e.g.,
Broderick, 2012 UT 17, ¶ 10
In any event, this argument is not persuasive. Although it is true that a
sentencing court may impose a civil penalty and include a civil penalty in a
sentence, the State cites no authority to suggest that a permanent criminal
stalking injunction is a civil penalty. The sentencing statute includes the phrase
“any other civil penalty” after listing things such as dissolving a corporation,
suspending or cancelling a license, or imposing a fine. See Utah Code Ann. § 763-201(3). Such penalties are civil because they are generally imposed in civil
court. The State cites no case in which a permanent criminal stalking injunction
was imposed in a civil case. Moreover, the term “civil penalty” is generally
considered a fine. See, e.g., Blacks Law Dictionary Eighth Edition 2004 at 1168
(defining “civil penalty” as “A fine assessed for a violation of a statute or
regulation”); Law.com, dictionary.law.com (defining “civil penalty” as “fines or
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surcharges imposed by a governmental agency to enforce regulations such as late
payment of taxes, failure to obtain permit, etc.”); Id. § 78B-6-1603 (imposing
“civil penalty” of a fine for hosting underage drinking gathering); id. § 19-6-416.5
(imposing “civil penalty of $500 per [unpermitted] underground storage tank”);
id. § 58-1-503 (allowing “civil penalty” of up to $2,000 per day for violating
written order under DOPL statutes); id. § 10-3-703(2)(a) (with limited exception,
allowing cities to impose “a civil penalty … by a fine not to exceed the maximum
class B misdemeanor fine”).4 The State cites no authority to suggest that a
permanent criminal injunction that is a mandatory part of a stalking sentence,
never expires, and cannot be dissolved except on request by the victim should be
considered a civil penalty. See id. § 76-5-106.5(12). Nor could it where civil
penalties are generally either fines or otherwise time-limited. As a result, the
State’s argument lacks merit.
III.

The State ignores Mr. Walton’s jurisdictional argument
with regard to his stalking conviction.
The State argues that because this Court generally lacks jurisdiction to

consider a collateral attack on a guilty plea via a direct appeal, that it should
decline to exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Walton’s challenge to his sentence in
The State’s argument ignores that there are two avenues to obtain a stalking
injunction—civil and criminal. Unlike a criminal stalking injunction, a civil
injunction does not require a stalking conviction, expires after three years, and
can be dissolved or modified by the respondent on a showing of good cause as
well as on the petitioner’s request. See Id. §§ 77-3a-101(9), (10), (13).
4
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Case No. 161907013.5 Br.Aple. at 18-19. However, if the stalking injunction is
vacated, Mr. Walton’s conviction for violating the injunction would be void ab
initio. See, e.g., Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798, 805 (2018) (citations
omitted) (direct appeal not barred where challenge to guilty plea that calls “into
question the Government’s power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’” a defendant).
Thus, as with any jurisdictional challenge this Court may consider Mr. Walton’s
challenge to his plea in Case No. 161907013. See, e.g., Van Der Stappen v. Van
Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (“[A] judgment can be
attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein and as stated in the Brief of Appellant, Mr.
Walton respectfully requests that in Case No. 121903179, the Court vacate the
criminal stalking injunction as an illegal sentence. In Case No. 16190713, Mr.
Walton respectfully requests that his conviction and sentence be vacated as void
ab initio.
DATED this 29th day of April 2019.

/s/ Deborah L. Bulkeley
Counsel for Appellant

Mr. Walton concedes that his notice of appeal in Case No. 161907013 was
untimely and notices the court that the contrary statement in his opening brief
was due to an inadvertent error by counsel in reviewing the record. However,
this does not change the analysis of whether this Court should exercise
jurisdiction to vacate the stalking conviction as void ab initio.
5
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